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WELCOME & INTRODUCTION

DEAN TREANOR:' Good evening, everyone. I am Bill Treanor,
the Dean of Fordham Law School, and it is my pleasure to welcome you
to the Fourth Annual Albert A. DeStefano Lecture, which is entitled
"Crisis in Confidence-Self-Regulation in the Securities Industry."
I thank our distinguished panelists for graciously being with us
tonight and for sharing their expertise and insight.
I especially thank Becker Ross Stone DeStefano & Klein for
establishing this lecture series honoring Albert A. DeStefano, a
prominent alumnus of the Law School who is currently Of Counsel to
the firm, and for the support which they have given to our Center for
Corporate, Securities and Financial Law (the "Center"). Our faculty and
students, as well as members of the community at large, all benefit from
the firm's generosity.
In these times in which continual controversies and new
developments have pushed the issues of corporate law and corporate
governance to the forefront of debates throughout the country, the Law
Accordingly, the views expressed herein by Mr. Colby and Ms. Nazareth are their own
and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or their colleagues on the
staff of the Commission.
1. William Michael Treanor is the Dean of the Fordham University School of
Law.
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School is particularly proud to have established the Center. The Center
allows the Law School to capitalize on its strengths in the business law
area. Our business law faculty is comprised both of well-known
scholars and prominent practitioners. Our students are enthusiastic
about business law and many of them will form the next generation of
business law leaders. Our current law alumni include many leaders in
the business community. And of course we are located in New York
City, the financial capital of the world.
Tonight's DeStefano Lecture is an important component of the
work of the Center, which is designed to provide a forum for dialogue
on policy issues and business law. In addition to the DeStefano
program, the Center offers a second annual public lecture, the A.A.
Sommer Lecture, which is typically given in the fall. This year's lecture
was delivered by The Honorable William McDonough, Chairman of the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.2
In addition to our public lectures, the Center hosts private
roundtable discussions. Last fall, the Center sponsored a roundtable
discussion on "The Role of the Corporate Attorney After Enron and the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act,"3 a discussion that was held just after the SEC
released its proposed rules regarding attorney conduct.4
In the spring the Corporate Center sponsored a roundtable that
considered "The Continued Role of Self-Regulation in the Securities
Industry," 5 a roundtable that inspired tonight's program. Just last week,
Duty of
the Center sponsored a roundtable on "Directors' Evolving
6
Public Faith and the Role of Ethics in the Board Room.",
The Center also hosts the bi-annual Eugene P. and Delia S. Murphy
Conference on Corporate Law. Our most recent conference, which was
held this past November, was entitled "Recent Developments in
Corporate Law,"7 and featured leading scholars from across the country
William J. McDonough, The Fourth Annual A. A. Sommer, Jr., Lecture on
2.
Corporate,Securities & FinancialLaw, 9 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 587 (2004).
3. For more information on this roundtable discussion and other Center events,
please visit http://www.fordham.edu/law/faculty/fisch/source.html.
4.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2002); Standards of
Professional Conduct for Attorneys Appearing and Practicing Before the Commission
in the Representation of an Issuer, 17 C.F.R. 205 (2004).
5. See supra note 3.
6. See id.
7. See id.
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presenting current work on cutting-edge issues in business law.
Within the Law School, the Center works closely with the Fordham
Journalof Corporate& FinancialLaw, which is one of the few studentrun journals specializing in business law. The Journal publishes
transcripts of many of the Center's public programs. The most recent
issue, which is available this evening, contains the proceedings from last
year's DeStefano Lecture.
Fordham's students also enjoy the Center's Business Law
Practitioners Series, which introduces students both to prominent
practitioners from the public and private sectors and to developing issues
in business law. These programs enjoy the generous support of a variety
of donors. Becker Ross Stone DeStefano & Klein, of course, provided
support for this lecture. The Center also receives substantial support
from the law firm of Morgan, Lewis & Bockius as well as the General
Electric Company and Eugene F. Murphy.
Guidance for the Center's many initiatives is drawn from the
leadership of a distinguished Board of Advisors as well as the active
participation of our many distinguished alumni in the business law area.
Indeed, for playing an important role in organizing tonight's
program and for serving as Moderator of the program, I am grateful to
John Peloso, the Chair of the Center's Board of Advisors and one of our
many prominent alumni. I am also grateful to Pamela Chepiga, a
member of the Board of Advisors and another one of our prominent
alumni, who created our Securities Arbitration Program and who
assisted in planning the program. And finally, I am grateful to Professor
Caroline Gentile of our faculty for the critical role she has played in the
work of the Center.
Instrumental in all the projects of the Center is Professor Jill Fisch,
who was just recently honored by her appointment as the Alpin J.
Cameron Professor of Law. Professor Fisch teaches and writes in the
areas of corporate and securities law and is one of the nation's leading
business law scholars. She is also a teacher of extraordinary excellence,
which I can say as somebody who has co-taught with her.
To introduce you to tonight's program, I now present to you
Professor Fisch.
PROF. FISCH: 8 Thank you. On behalf of the Fordham Center for
8. Jill E. Fisch is the Alpin J. Cameron Professor of Law at the Fordham
University School of Law and is the Director of the Fordham Center for Corporate,
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Corporate, Securities and Financial Law, I too, want to welcome you to
tonight's Albert A. DeStefano Lecture.
As you know, the issue of self-regulation in the securities industry
has generated a fair amount of recent controversy. Self-regulation is a
concept that dates back to the adoption of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 ("34 Act"). 9 The self-regulatory organizations ("SROs"),
including the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD")
and the New York Stock Exchange, Inc. ("NYSE") in particular, have
long claimed an expertise in regulating the activities of market
participants.
Yet, we have seen many recent changes. We have seen changes in
the business structure of the NASD and NASDAQ and changes in the
governance structure of the NYSE. We have seen developments in new
technology, including new trading entities, electronic exchanges, and
electronic trading systems.
We have seen Wall Street develop new ways of investing and new
ways of defrauding investors. This, in turn, generates a greater need for
oversight of market participants and regulatory enforcement against
wrongdoers. And we have seen a shifting and expansion of the SEC's
regulatory mandate and its role in supervising the SROs.
Let me highlight just a few of the issues that I think are on the table
for our panelists tonight.
The Commission is considering new rules governing the way stocks
are traded, rules that could facilitate automation but possibly sacrifice
getting investors the best possible price.
The NYSE, as you know, is still embroiled in controversy over the
pay package of its former Chairman and CEO Richard Grasso. The
NYSE and the SEC also recently released findings of improper stocktrading activity among the Big Board's five largest specialist firms,
findings that have resulted in a settlement in which the firms will pay a
combined $241.8 million in fines and restitution.' 0
And, despite its recent implementation of new corporate
governance listing standards designed to promote greater responsibility

Securities and Financial Law.
9. Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78mm (2005).
10. Press release, Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, Settlement Reached With Five
Specialist Firms for Violating Federal Sec. Laws and NYSE Regulations (Mar. 30,
2004), at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-42.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2005).
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and independence by issuers' boards of directors, NASDAQ has come
under scrutiny for the unusually poor attendance records of its own
directors.
I cannot imagine a finer panel to identify the new challenges for the
SROs and to help us understand how those challenges can best be met.
It is our goal here at the Center to identify important and timely
issues in corporate and securities law and to provide a forum in which
those issues can be debated. I want to add my thanks to Becker Ross
Stone DeStefano & Klein for establishing this lecture series as a means
of doing that.
As you know, the lecture series is named for our distinguished
alumnus Albert A. DeStefano, and we are most grateful to have the
honor of hosting this wonderful program. As Dean Treanor has
mentioned, support for the Center's programs is drawn from the
leadership of the distinguished Board of Advisors, and I want to echo
Dean Treanor's special thanks to John Peloso and Pam Chepiga for
organizing tonight's program. We also enjoy the active participation
and support of many other distinguished alumni in the business and
financial law areas.
The Center could not function, however, without the commitment
of the Fordham faculty, and I want to acknowledge in particular
Professor Caroline Gentile, one of our newest hires. Professor Gentile
teaches corporations and corporate finance. In her short tenure, she has
already written several major law review articles and she has been
instrumental in shaping the Center and its programs.
I also want to acknowledge the hard work of the Corporate Center
Fellow, Florencia Marotta, and the fabulous students on the Fordham
Journalof Corporate& FinancialLaw. Many of you met them on your
way in, and they have helped tremendously with the logistics of this
program.
Finally, where would the Center be without the guidance of a senior
mentor? For the Center this guidance has come in the person of
Constantine "Gus" Katsoris.
Professor Katsoris, the Wilkinson
Professor of Law, has just received his second Bene Merente Medal
acknowledging forty years of service on the Fordham faculty. Professor
Katsoris's connection to Fordham goes back even further, however, as
he received both his law and undergraduate degrees from Fordham.
Professor Katsoris teaches in the areas of income tax and
accounting. His scholarship includes work on a range of business law
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topics, but he enjoys particular expertise and influence on issues relating
to securities arbitration. His accomplishments are too numerous to
describe here, but as a result of his range of professional activities he
knows virtually everyone in the securities industry, which as you can
imagine makes him invaluable to the Center.
I am honored to present to you now Professor Katsoris to speak to
you about Mr. DeStefano's accomplishments and then to introduce the
participants in tonight's program.
Thank you.
PROF. KATSORIS: 1' Thank you, Jill.
Al DeStefano was and is a close friend of mine, and it is an honor
to speak on his behalf. I called Al a few weeks ago in the hope of
arranging his presence here tonight, but, regretfully, he informed me that
unexpectedly his beloved son, Albert A. DeStefano, Jr., had passed
away on Holy Thursday of Easter Week.
After we exchanged some understandably emotional and
sentimental conversation, two things became very clear to me. Number
one, Al was nurtured by his religious roots and his firm belief in an
afterlife.
Secondly, he felt consoled that his son's name would
somehow be perpetuated by the lecture series that also bears his name.
For those of you who never met Al, let me briefly describe him to
you. He started at Fordham Law School as an evening student, worked
during the day, and yet he still managed to make Law Review and
graduate at the top of his class. He accomplished all this with the
demeanor of kindness, of honesty, and great integrity.
After graduation, armed with these same characteristics of
kindness, humility, and integrity, he rose to become a Senior Partner in
the firm of Becker Ross Stone DeStefano & Klein. Yet, despite his
professional successes, his family always came first, and in the process
he never forgot his Fordham family. For over ten years, he found the
time to come back and lecture to our students on the intricacies of
corporate mergers and acquisitions.
His compassion for others, however, did not stop there. For many
years, he was a member of the Board of Directors of Gallaudet
University in Washington, which is the only liberal arts university for
the deaf in the world. For thirty-five years he served as Secretary and
11.
Constantine N. Katsoris is the Wilkinson Professor of Law at the Fordharn
University School of Law.
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Trustee of the Helen Keller Services for the Blind. For twenty years he
served as Trustee for the Cleary School for the Deaf.
By honoring Albert A. DeStefano, Sr. with this lecture series,
Fordham honors itself. And, as of tonight, it also honors his beloved
son, Albert A. DeStefano, Jr.
It is now my pleasure to briefly introduce and thank our
distinguished panelists for this evening. It is a line-up of all-stars in the
securities industry, several of whom honored us last year as part of the
panel of the DeStefano Lecture.
Starting on my far right and moving to the left: Brandon Becker,
who is a Partner at the Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP firm
and former Director of the SEC's Division of Market Regulation; next to
him is Robert Colby, the Deputy Director of the SEC's Division of
Market Regulation; next to him is Annette Nazareth, the present
Director of the SEC's Division of Market Regulation; skipping over
John Peloso for the moment, we have Marc Lackritz, who has been the
President of the Securities Industry Association for over ten years; next
to him is Richard Ketchum, the Chief Regulatory Officer of the NYSE
and a former Director of the SEC's Division of Market Regulation, and
also a distinguished member of our Adjunct Faculty.
To my left is Mary Schapiro, the Vice Chairman of the National
Association of Securities Dealers. Mary was the featured speaker at the
inauguration of the A. A. Sommer Lecture several years ago, delivering
an extraordinary lecture on "The Regulation of the Securities Industry in
the Wake of the 9/11 Tragedy.' 2 I will never forget that, Mary. It was
a brilliant lecture.
Finally, I would like to introduce our moderator of the panel, the
maestro for this evening, John Peloso. John's lists of accomplishments
speak for themselves and it would take much too long to mention them
all.
In many ways, John Peloso and I have a lot in common. We are
both of Mediterranean ancestry, we both teach at Fordham, we both
received our undergraduate and our law degrees at Fordham, and we
both attended New York City Jesuit high schools. But that is where the
similarity ends, because John attended a preppy Jesuit high school on the
East Side, called Regis, and I attended a more traditional Jesuit high
12. Mary L. Schapiro, The Regulation of the Securities Industry in the Wake of the
9/11 Tragedy, 7 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 5 (2001).
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school on the West Side, called Xavier. Anyone familiar with Jesuit
education knows that the rivalry between these two schools is
comparable to the feud between the Hatfield's and the McCoy's. But,
John, besides teaching Latin and Greek, the Jesuits at Xavier taught me
to forgive and forget. So tonight, John, I want you to know I forgive
you for going to Regis High School.
Ladies and gentlemen, it is my great pleasure to introduce one of
Fordham Law School's distinguished graduates, my high school friend
John Peloso.
MR. PELOSO: Gus, I did not think there was much of a
competition because I do not really think there is any comparison
between the two schools, although Xavier put somebody on the Supreme
Court first, because that is where Justice Scalia went. No comment.
PANEL DISCUSSION

MR. PELOSO: Now to business.
Rick Ketchum has asked me to mention to you that something
awfully urgent has come up which may require him to leave a little bit
early, so if you see him leave it is not because of something else.
Our format tonight is basic and simple. My role will be to throw
out what would probably be fairly obvious questions to the panel
relating to the subject of self-regulation, and the panelists will express
their views.
As Jill said, I could not think of a more appropriate panel to discuss
the whole issue of self-regulation than the people here at the table
tonight.
The first question I throw out is the broad one, which is: Is the
system of self-regulation in the securities industry being carried out
today as it was envisioned by the drafters of the legislation in 1934?
In answering that, and I thought I would throw this out for the
panel, I thought it might be interesting to see what the Report of the
Special Study of the Securities Markets, 3 (the "Report") which was
reported out in August of 1963, thirty years after the passage of the
securities laws, and which is a wonderful source of history in this
industry. I thought it would be interesting to see what the Report
13.

SECURITIES

AND

EXCHANGE

COMM'N,

REPORT

OF

SPECIAL

STUDY

OF

SECURITIES MARKETS, H.R. DOC. No. 95, pt. 1-4 (1st Sess. 1963) [hereinafter REPORT].
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concluded on self-regulation thirty years after passage as a prelude to
our discussion tonight as this will be the seventieth year after the
passage of the 1934 securities legislation. There are a few quotes that I
think are instructive.
If anybody is really interested in this, it is Part IV, Chapter 12,
called "The Regulatory Pattern." 4 The subject here is "The Purposes
and Use of Self-Regulation." The Report quoted the Silver v. NYSE
case with which many of you may be familiar.15 It said that the purpose
was "to delegate governmental power to working institutions which
would undertake at their own initiative"-these words are really
interesting-"to enforce compliance with ethical as well as legal
standards in a complex and changing industry."' 6 There are a lot of
components to that definition. The Report further analyzed the concept
this way: historically, they concluded that it was based upon issues of
"practicality and expediency."' 7 Presumably, the Commission could not
do everything. But it recognized several other advantages, which I think
are very relevant to what we are talking about tonight.
First the Report mentioned the expertise of the people in the
industry, of the members of the industry, and referred to securities as
"intricate merchandise," which comes from a federal court opinion in
New York.'" The Report then concluded that the persons on the scene in
the industry can be more effective sometimes than a government agency
in regulation.' 9 This is very interesting again when you think of what we
are dealing with today.
The Report quoted Justice Douglas, who was formerly Chairman of
the SEC,20 who put it this way: "Self-discipline in conformity to law,
voluntary law obedience so complete that there is nothing left for the
government representatives to do"-think about that today-"obedience
2
to ethical standards beyond those any law can establish., '

14. Id. at part IV, 493.
15.
Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
16. Id. at 371.
17. REPORT, supra note 14 part IV, at 693.
18. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 306 F.2d 606,
614 (1962).
19. REPORT, supra note 14 part IV, at 694.
20. William 0. Douglas, Chairman of the SEC from 1937 to 1939.
21.
REPORT, supra note 14 part IV, at 694 (quoting a 1938 speech by Chairman
Douglas).
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The Report also suggested that one of the benefits of the industry
participating in the process was that it would make it more palatable and
they would be more aware of their own stake in the process.22 This is a
very relevant concept.
And finally, the creators of the Report recognized, on the other
hand, that there were some limitations, The ones they identified were:
the weakness in human nature, to perhaps not be as diligent as they
otherwise might; the members might be more complacent about the
public interest factor and not be as motivated to deal with that; they may
be more inclined to interpret rules more narrowly.
Anyway, that is the end of what I had to say. But it seems to me
that it is an interesting backdrop to throw out the question to the panel:
Is the system of self-regulation being carried out today with those kinds
of principles being practiced?
I would like to start with Annette.
MS. NAZARETH: Those are very interesting words. I have to say
that even when Chairman Douglas articulated that, I suspect that that
was somewhat aspirational. I think that there has always been a
recognition that self-regulation, while it has worked generally well over
time, has flaws, as can be expected when any self-interested group
oversees its own activities.
On the other hand, I think it has, as you stated, been helpful to tap
the industry expertise and make the industry responsible for funding
much of its oversight. But there have been some very notable failures in
self-regulation, and you indicated in your remarks that you think this is
one of those times when we should yet again question whether this
model can work.
There also have been some changes in the structure of the industry
that have made it more complex to continue with the model that we
have. We certainly have more competition among markets than we have
had before. A consequence of that is order flow that shifts from one
marketplace to another, which can make it difficult for SROs to rely on a
steady stream of income to fund regulation, a significant portion of
which comes from the market data revenues.
The proliferation of ATSs2 3 and ECNs2 4 which are competitors of

22. Id.
23. Alternative trading systems (ATSs) are electronic trading platforms that reduce
Securities and Exchange
the need for personal contact on the trading floor.
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the SROs and are also regulated by them, have further complicated our
self-regulatory regime. This clearly was not something which was
originally contemplated by the 34 Act. And today with the trend toward
demutualization and for-profit exchanges, we have yet another
additional layer of complexity and potential concern that, likely could
not have been envisioned by Congress when it implemented the system
of self-regulation in the federal securities laws. The 34 Act instead
contemplated traditional mutual organizations.
Therefore, we find ourselves addressing new concerns not directly
envisioned by the 34 Act relating, for example, to the possible undue
influence of persons controlling shareholder owned exchanges over the
regulatory function.
MR. PELOSO: Can I just ask you, Annette, why would the
increasing complexity in the industry work against self-regulation? I
would think, to pick up the Report's idea, that the increasing
complexities in the industry might make the use of that expertise in the
regulatory process more important.
MS. NAZARETH: Well, I think industry expertise is valued and
necessary, and is something that the staff would be reluctant to
compromise.
But on the other hand, with more marketplaces
aggressively competing for the same order flow, there is a risk that the
quality of regulation could be compromised. In essence, order flow
providers can choose the venue in which they will bring their order flow
and among other things, can shop for the best regulatory deal. The Staff
has actually seen examples of this in the options markets. That is of
great concern as well.
I do not think that situations such as this were contemplated by the
34 Act. The markets were much less competitive and fragmented when
that statute was adopted Certainly, at that time the over-the-counter
market largely resided under one umbrella, but now the market is much
more diverse and competitive and I think it is much harder to assure
ourselves that we have the same level of regulation across all markets.
MR. LACKRITZ: Could I address that question about complexity?
I completely agree with what Annette is saying and I think the challenge

Commission at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrecn.shtml.
24. Electronic Communications Networks (ECNs) are electronic trading systems
that automatically match buy and sell orders at specified prices. Securities and
Exchange Commission at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg/mrecn.shtml.

2005]

ALBERTA. DeSTEFANO LECTURE

is that the increasing complexity and the increasing competition has also
created increased conflicts of interest among and between the SROs, for
example, and the industry.
The SROs are in the process of building up their businesses. They
have far more of their revenues coming from market data fees than they
do from member fees and they are creating new products and services
that compete directly with the industry. At some level, that is part of the
reason, I suspect, why the NASDAQ separated from the NASD. But in
fact it creates a fundamental conflict of interest.
You also have a lot of the firms in the industry sponsoring trading
platforms that are competing directly with the trading platforms of the
SROs. So, all of a sudden, instead of having a simple world where you
have many SROs and oversight of SROs, the walls are disappearing, and
the result is that there is more competition, more complexity, and more
conflicts of interest. This creates a totally different situation and a totally
different context, I think, from what we have had in the past.
MR. PELOSO: What does that do for the concept of self-regulation,
accepting that thesis, Mary?
MS. SCHAPIRO: I was actually going to take a little different
approach because I think the NASD is rather uniquely situated, since
we, depending on the day of the week, do not operate markets or do not
want to operate markets, and really exist as an SRO in a different form
than Marc or Annette were really describing.
Given that, I think some of the words you used, John, actually are
pretty close to accurate, even right now, for self-regulation, despite some
of the issues that we have seen evolve over the last couple of years
including SROs acting on their own initiative, as well as evolving legal
and ethical aspects.
When we write rules at the NASD, they are well informed by the
industry perspective through a series of committees, but they are decided
ultimately by a Board of Governors that is composed of a majority of
non-industry people who very much have the public interest at heart.
The industry pays for the nearly $600 million of additional regulation.
We think we get better, more effective, operational rules as the result of
the industry participation.
And we have this very elastic standard of ethical conduct, which is
"commercial honor and just and equitable principles of trade. 2 5 Some
25.

NASD Conduct Rule, Exch. Act Release No. 34-45156 (December 14, 2001).
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ethical violations do not necessarily fit under specific rules.
So I think in a lot of ways, because we do not face some of the
conflicts, and because we have been solely a regulator for a long time,
we meet a lot of the standards that were set out, which were perhaps
aspirational at the time they were spoken.
Some of the weaknesses you raised I think have also been
addressed by all of the SROs over the intervening thirty years through
The
the change in exchange governance and SRO governance.
governance has moved more towards public representation, as a result of
a much more vigorous oversight of the SROs in the last ten years by the
SEC.
So the frailties of human nature and not acting in the public interest
I think have been addressed in a lot of ways. That is not to say that it is
perfect, but I think it suffers from no more flaws than really any
governing construct would.
MR. BECKER: Well, I would like to just pick up a couple of points
there, more from the defense side.
Historically there was the view that self-regulation would articulate
ethical norms above and beyond those set forth in a positive law.
Nevertheless, the combination of recent developments and the pressure
of press scrutiny has meant that for some technical purposes, civil
private rights of action and the like, the idea that there is this penumbra
of ethical business obligations above and beyond those stated in positive
law has pretty much collapsed. The idea that the SEC is going to defer
to some violation of NASD advertising rules as being an ethical norm
but not implicating § 10(b) 26 or Rule lOb-5 27 is just not credible in the
current competitive environment.
Second, the regulatory structure changed. Now every broker-dealer
has to be a member of an SRO, there is no other alternative, as was done
in the past.28
Third, the governance of the SROs is changing. To the extent that
the SROs were in fact created as membership organizations to reflect the
membership's views, to reflect the ethical norms, as opposed to lawgenerative bodies to reflect public law considerations and policies, they
have now been transmogrified into public law-making bodies, and
26.
27.
28.

Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2005).
29 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
Sec. Exch. Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78(o) (2005).

2005]

ALBERTA. DeSTEFANO LECTURE

accordingly there have been new standards in the name of conflicts of
interest. Basically they have become public boards making public rules
for an industry. This in part undermines the credibility and expertise of
those bodies as a reflection of the industry itself.
And finally, the ever-more-vigorous SEC oversight has highlighted
the possibility that the SROs, rather than being a reflection of evolving
industry norms, are more of an extension of the government. Therefore
the SROs are more of an enforcement arm of the government without
the protections of the government when you are dealing with them,
rather than a reflection of industry norms.2 9
MR. PELOSO: Before you leave that point, I think I saw a very
interesting phrase in the Report, which I was not going to mention
unless it became relevant. Part IV, Chapter 12, of the Report recognizes
that when an SRO conducts delegated activity it is "acting as an official
arm or a delegate of governmental power., 30 This is an interesting
subject when you think of what you just said, Brandon, which is that you
do not have the same constitutional rights before the exchanges.
MR. BECKER: There is a long body of cases protecting the ability
of SROs to act as if they were membership organizations, which you are
familiar with, John, and that is an important body of law. 31 But what
that body of law does not reflect is the interaction between the press and
the plaintiffs' bar, and then the competition among regulators, and then
actions based on failure to provide e-mails. This suggests that a brokerdealer does not have a great deal of flexibility in responding to the
demands of its "membership" organization, which it is compelled by
statute to be a member of in the first place.
MR. PELOSO: Rick, can the NYSE effectively compete in the
marketplace and at the same time conduct its self-regulatory activities?

29. See e.g., Turf War on Street Hurts All Parties,FIN. TIMES, May 1, 2004 at 11.
30. REPORT, supranote 14 part IV, at 697.
Desiderio v. NASD, 191 F.3d 198, 207 (1999); see also United States v.
31.
Shvarts, 90 F.Supp.2d 219 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) ("It is beyond cavil that the NASD is not a
government agency; it is a not-for-profit corporation. It was not created by statute,
none of its directors ...are government officials or appointees. It receives no
government finding ... , [and] its actions cannot be imputed to the government."),
abrogatedon other grounds by, United States v. Coppa, 267 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2001);
Marchiano v. National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc., 134 F.Supp.2d 90, 95 (D.D.C.
2001); United States v. Bloom, 450 F.Supp 323 (E.D. Pa. 1978); United States v.
Solomon, 509 F.2d 863 (2d Cir. 1975).
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MR. KETCHUM: Sure, but it cannot do it the way the Report
discussed forty years ago, which is why the words are, not surprisingly,
not quite the same and why Brandon has to deal with a different reality
and-guess what?-so do Mary and I, and I guess I even did when I
previously worked at Citigroup.
Yes, the NYSE, as NASDAQ, as any of the options exchanges, and
as any marketplace, faces, as Annette points out, a much more
competitive environment than before. They are competing and member
firms, as Marc pointed out, are sponsoring various alternatives to classic
primary markets, and this creates risks and concerns of retribution and
balance in deciding what areas to pursue or not. That is a fact. It
requires a different type of governance environment for self-regulation
than existed before.
Mary described what happened at the NASD. I would say the great
thing about Mary is that she created that culture even before NASDAQ
spun off through a separate reporting relationship with the board.
I think that is the answer why the NYSE will operate effectively as
a self-regulatory organization and as a marketplace. The NYSE today in
its new governance environment, indeed, has managed to segregate its
members so that they operate under a separate advisory board, albeit it
we are fortunate enough to have a regulatory committee, which is what I
report directly to, that has two out of three members with a great deal of
financial experience.
It may or may not be the greatest solution, but that is it, guys. I
think if self-regulation is going to operate in an environment where there
are greater concerns of conflict in how it operates, then it is going to
have to be an entity that has a more public-driven board than before.
As Mary indicated, the SRO remains an entity that is substantially
committee-driven and has in its fiber concern and a strong ethic of
understanding the industry and understanding the market that it
regulates. I think, in judgment, when one looks at the alternatives and
recognizes that we are not in a world of banking regulation where you
can provide a primarily oversight environment with relatively little
enforcement function, I am not sure you want to lose that, from a
knowledge standpoint, from leverage with respect to industry resources,
or from the flexibility-albeit, Brandon is right, sometimes that is
concluded as fraud in fairly amazing situations over the last couple of
years. It does not change the continuing ability for those SROs as well
to try to work out regulatory structures that are outside of the fraud

20051

ALBERTA. DeSTEFANO LECTURE

context and deliver differential penalties from what is outside the fraud
context.
So is it the same self-regulatory model that existed before? No.
Does it depend on, for better or worse, a concept of gentlemen's
understanding and commitment to an ethical environment that may have
existed in a less-competitive securities market thirty years ago? No.
Does it still provide something unique and different and has it evolved to
address some of those conflict issues that people were concerned with?
Yes.
And then I think the question comes at the end: Does it continue to
provide value-added to investors, to the industry, and to the SEC? Yes,
of course I am prejudiced, but I think yes. That seems to me the fair set
of questions.
MR. BECKER: Could I make a small comment from a different
context? I have always thought that in the government securities
markets, if you looked at it in the early 1960s, you could run that market
basically through a club membership, and the New York Federal
Reserve could decide who was in the club and who was not, when it was
a relatively smaller market.
It never seemed like a surprise to me that with the explosion of the
U.S. debt markets, all the people who came into that market, the
development of new technologies and trading systems, that you
eventually got the Government Securities Act of 1986,32 which is a more
bureaucratized oversight process.
I think that is part of what Rick and Mary were just describing. I
mean we do have a bigger, more complicated system that cannot rely on
basically the same level of informality that it did before. And if you are
on the defense side, you want to have procedural protections and
safeguards because it is no longer the same sort of club that you joined a
long time ago.
MR. PELOSO: What has really emerged here in terms of the
relative roles of the Commission, on the one hand, and the SROs, on the
other? One would think when you read the literature that the whole idea
was that the SROs would regulate themselves and only when they really
did not regulate themselves would the SEC step in. Maybe that is
wrong, but that is the sense you get.
32. Government Securities Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-571, § 1, 110 Stat. 3208
(1986) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78o-5 (1986)).

184

FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORA TE &
FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. X

Today one gets the impression that we have regulation essentially
by the SEC, and the SROs are basically being asked to toe a mark.
Now, there may be nothing wrong with that, but it seems to me the
model has changed.
What do you think, Marc?
MR. LACKRITZ: I completely agree that the model has changed. I
think the basic question is: Is there any "self' in self-regulation? I mean,
do we have any "self' left at all?
I think we get imprisoned at some level by language; language that
consists of terms that we have always used in the past. But when you
see that of the twenty members of the Board of the NASD only eight
come from the securities industry, is that really self-regulation? When
you have a Board of the NYSE that includes nobody, not a single
individual, from the securities industry, is that self-regulation? When
you have the SEC providing direction to the SROs on what they should
be enforcing and by vigorously overseeing them-which I might add
may well be in the public interest because that is an important function
to be served-is that really self-regulation?
I would suggest to you that none of this is self-regulation anymore.
It is a different form of regulation. Does it work well, does it serve the
public? I think those are the relevant questions.
But it seems to me that the terms we are using are no longer
relevant because I think self-regulation has really changed that
dramatically, just to be somewhat controversial.
MS. SCHAPIRO: I have to respond to that. Whether you call it
"self-regulation" or you call it "private sector regulation," my view is
there is still an enormous amount of industry participation in the
regulatory process at the SROs. I will let Rick speak to the NYSE.
Yes, our board has a majority of non-industry members, but we
have dozens of committees representing hundreds of industry
participants with specific subject matter expertise, whether it is fixed
income or variable annuities or bank broker-dealer issues. We have
hundreds of participants in regional committees that represent brokerage
firms in different parts of the country. These participants have their
different ways of doing business that are in fact regional and illustrate
that this is an enormously diverse industry. There are 5,600 brokerdealers that do business with the public.
We have hearing panels that adjudicate disciplinary actions. Two
of the three people on a hearing panel are industry members.
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We have a new program, called consultative committees, of people
who are rolling off of district committees after their three years of
service, who can advise us on what kinds of cases we should be
bringing. They can look at specific fact patterns and give us input into
the whole disciplinary process. We take to them some of our thorniest
issues, whether it is municipal bond pricing or what to do with respect to
particular types of products. They give us localized, very specific
expertise to help us address those kinds of questions.
And then we can do something the government really can not do,
and that is provide tools for firms for compliance. So if we have new
anti-money laundering rules under the Patriot Act,33 we can write a

template that firms can use to fulfill their anti-money laundering "know
your customer" obligations.
We can hold phone-in workshops where 2,000 or 3,000 firms call in
and spend three hours on the phone listening to NASD staff help them
walk through the interstices and the intricacies of all of these new rules
and how they fit together and how they potentially work together.
Those are things the government is not in a position to do. They
have to convene an advisory committee under the Federal Advisory
Committee Act.34 They can not have a set of standing committees that
are just available to them to provide expertise. They have tremendous
talent on the Commission, but they do not get to move people in and out
depending upon the types of expertise they need, whether it is insurancerelated or investment company-related.
I think there is still a huge amount of "self' in self-regulation and a
huge amount of value that is provided to the process that reflects itself
not only in our disciplinary actions and in our rule-making, but also in
our comment letters to the SEC and in our everyday conversations with
SEC staff about the rules the Commission is contemplating.
MR. KETCHUM: I would just add a little bit, but I would take a
slightly different tack, although I certainly agree with what Mary said.
In some ways, Marc, you're right. As I said before, it has changed.
The governance environment and the expectations of the SEC change
the manner in which we work. But we do not work the way the
Uniting And Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required
33.
To Intercept And Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA Patriot Act), Pub. L. No. 10756, § 311-377, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
34. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. 92-463, § 9, 86 Stat. 770 (1972).
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government does, and I think that is the point Mary made.
We do view our mission differently from an education standpoint
and from an interface standpoint with the industry. We interact with the
industry in a different way and feel comfortable about interacting with
the industry in a different way than the SEC either has the opportunity,
the luxury, or maybe even the comfort to do.
In the end, I want to stay away from "she [sic] protests too much."35
It is up to other people to decide whether indeed self-regulation, as
defined in this environment, continues to provide value. I guess I would
not be back in it if I did not think it did, and particularly in seeing how
people like Mary made it and make it operate in that way.
But it will be different. I think the question I always ask in asking
whether you want to eliminate self-regulation is the question of what
you want to operate in its path as a separation. Indeed, I think if you do
move to the alternative, either an entirely bank regulatory type of
environment from the strict government standpoint, or to an accounting
board type of environment where it is entirely separated from not only
markets but expected to be separated from the industry, it may work
better, it may work worse. But it will be undeniably different as to its
ethics and how it relates with the industry that it does regulate.
MR. PELOSO: In the enforcement part of the self-regulatory
process, what is the panel's view as to whether the SROs are being
delegated a portion of the larger enforcement initiative dictated by the
SEC, or are they enforcing their own rules? Is there coordination
between the SROs and the Commission?
I will tell you from a practitioner's standpoint, sometimes it is hard
to tell how the territory has been divided up. On the one hand, when a
practitioner suggests that there are too many parallel proceedings and
everybody is investigating everybody, we are always told, "But no, we
talk to each other, we do not overlap."
So which is it? If you talk and overlap, how do you divide
everything up, or do you?
MS. SCHAPIRO: Well, let me start off and then I will let Rick
speak to this too.
First of all, we are required to enforce not only NASD rules but also
the federal securities laws and SEC rules. That requires coordination
35. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE,
protest too much.").

HAMLET,

Act III, Scene 2 (stating "The lady doth
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between SROs and the Enforcement Division at the SEC.
The one thing I can unequivocally say, is that we are not delegated
any areas to be responsible for that the SEC will then not be responsible
for. I think it is fair to say that if we have good coverage in a particular
area, the SEC is likely to have a comfort level that we are enforcing SEC
rules in that area and not wander in. This is because they have precious
few resources as it is to do the job they need to do. To the extent we can
all leverage our resources by not duplicating each other, it is to our
benefit, the NYSE's, and the SEC's.
I would say there is a high level of coordination. We do some cases
together. Those are relatively few. Some of them are the big ones, like
the global settlement with respect to research and investment banking
conflicts of interest, and there are the occasional very, very large cases,
where we will actually each take a section of the case and do the
investigation and then globally settle it. But it is a pretty rare instance
where we actually duplicate each other's efforts.
The cases we bring, we bring because we think we need to bring
them, not because the SEC has directed us to.
MR. KETCHUM: I am a new recruit here and I probably cannot
help but I have my Citibank hat on a little bit as well.
I think we can do better. I think Mary is absolutely right on the
whole. I think people can be focused on a few events with respect to
extremely high-profile cases, and I think there are some situations where
we can do better with respect to coordination.
I think that on the whole what you usually see is the SEC
leveraging either the NASD or NYSE or both resources, which results in
more than three different entities striking out on their own. I think there
is less of a willingness at the SEC to delegate decision-making while
continuing to use the leverage of the self-regulatory organizations with
respect to major cases.
But as I say, I am looking at this mostly from the outside in.
MR. PELOSO: Annette, what is your view of that subject from the
SEC standpoint?
MS. NAZARETH: I am not in the Enforcement Division, but I do
believe that we try to coordinate. Obviously, there are some very highprofile cases where the Commission wants to have a presence as well as
have the SROs involved, but my sense is that those are selected because
there is a certain message that people want to convey.
Otherwise, I agree with Mary, I think that there is a sense that we
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have precious resources that we want to leverage and for the most part
the intention is not to duplicate each other's work.
MR. LACKRITZ: You know, John, if I could just interject for a
second, if you look at the panel, we have lots of regulators and selfregulators and an industry representative here on this panel. The dogs
that did not bark here are the state securities administrators. In fact, that
is really the development that has thrown all this into a fairly significant
state of transition, confusion and competition. This is because we have a
state attorney general, in this case Attorney General Spitzer, discovering
something that was not discovered by the SkOs or the SEC, bringing an
action, and suddenly creating a totally different paradigm for how the
laws ought to be enforced. The result is that the regulatory agency, the
SEC, and the SROs are under enormous pressure for competitive
reasons to in fact do something, get out there, and show their stuff.
That, it seems to me, does create the potential for lots of duplication, lots
of repetition, and lots of inefficiencies in a system that otherwise should
be relatively efficient.
MR. PELOSO: Well, I think about a year ago Attorney General
Spitzer was quoted in the papers as saying, in words or substance, that
self-regulation did not work.3 6 Some of you may have seen that. So you
know where he stands, I suppose.
MS. SCHAPIRO: I just want to disagree with something Marc said.
I should actually start, though, by agreeing with something Rick said,
which is something we can always do better, there is no question about
it. There are a lot of people out there working towards the same goals,
and it is not always perfect.
I do not want to be na'fve and say that there is no competition
among regulators because there probably is some, but I think that it is
nowhere near what the industry believes there is. But when somebody
like Attorney General Spitzer identifies a problem, the fact that all the
other regulators run towards it does not mean they are competing. It is
that a serious investor protection issue has been surfaced and needs to be
addressed by everybody to the greatest extent we possibly can.
So again, while not trying to be a Pollyanna, I think we are
motivated by a broad investor protection concern about some of the
conduct that was going on in the fund area and less by competition
36. David Cay Johnston, Officials of 14 States Pledge ProtectionofPensionAssets,
N.Y. TIMEs, August 13, 2002, at 7.
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among the regulators.
MR. BECKER: I think structurally everyone works hard to try to be
efficient and not waste their time and energy, but we all have too many
war stories about a high-profile press event. This is where the regulators
are tripping over one another to get through the door, and they have not
coordinated their activities, and they are not leveraging their resources.
They are asking you for the same documents on the same day, and they
are asking you for the same e-mails, and they want to interview the same
witnesses, and they are not willing to defer to one another." That is not
a pretty picture.
Allocating resources across an industry-wide problem, for example,
late trading, and deciding who is going to take firms A-to-D and who is
going to take firms E-to-G, makes a lot of sense. If you were a systems
analyst professor, you would divide it up and think about how you were
doing that in an efficient manner. But sending five different regulators
into the same firm on the same day so they can fight over who gets to
talk to whom does not make a lot of sense.
MR. PELOSO: Maybe we need to have self-regulation in one
super-enforcer.
MR. BECKER: Well that is an interesting thought, because there is
a big difference between the enforcement issues and the structural
issues. You could make that distinction.
MR. PELOSO: Bob Colby, we have not heard from you. What is
your view of what participation the industry has these days in the selfregulatory process?
MR. COLBY: I think the changes in the governance have been all
for the good, in the sense that they have given the self-regulators the
freedom to express themselves if they will.
But I think Mary is absolutely right; it is incorrect to say there is no
industry participation in the self-regulatory organizations. We see it
every day. Sometimes we see it positively, sometimes we see it
negatively. We see rule filings that clearly have been shaped in a way
that they are much more focused, much clearer, much more workable,
and still achieve the ends. That is a positive sense.
We see other rule filings where we just cannot understand why the
SRO does not go the final step and complete the process and come up
with what seems like a solution. Then we realize that there has been
37.

See supra note 29.

190

FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LA W

[Vol. X

heavy involvement of an industry committee in the process and the
committee just does not want that outcome.
From both ways I think the industry is still very, very involved in
the process, and I think on the large part that is good.
One aspect that no one has touched on is that there is a huge
amount of the regulation of the securities industry and the markets that is
very, very detailed and is working very well. If the Commission were to
do it, this regulation would not be a pretty picture. Things like the
Uniform Practice Code 3 -I mean how many people ever know what the
Uniform Practice Code is, or how yields are calculated in municipal
markets? There is a formula in the Municipal Securities Rulemaking
Board ("MSRB") Rule Book listing five different ways to calculate
yields, and so everybody calculates it that way. Bond yield calculators
are even programmed that way. This creates standardization that only an
industry group that is close to industry practice could do."
MR. LACKRITZ: But, John, I do not think I said that the industry
was not involved with self-regulatory organizations. I mean it is like the
story about the chicken and the pig: a guy is having scrambled eggs and
bacon for breakfast, and he says, "You know, the chicken is sort of
involved because they lay the eggs, but the pig is really committed
because there is the bacon."
We have moved from a situation of having the industry really
committed to self-regulation to one where yes, it is involved, but it is a
very different, reduced role. Yes, there is input, sure, but, with all due
respect to Mary and the staff of the NASD and Rick and the staff of the
NYSE, it is much more staff-driven now than it has been in the past.
I think that is partly because the industry has changed so
dramatically. We have moved from having a relatively small club
basically dealing in this industry, overseeing one another, understanding
why and how you get in the club, to a more democratized system in the
last twenty years, and as a result you have a lot more people and
investors and institutions in the marketplace. There are a lot more
participants. It is not the homogeneous, common sort of small group.
As a result, yes, you have industry involvement, but it is not

38. NASDAQ,
UNIFORM
PRACTICE
CODE,
http://www.sec.gov/pdf/nasdl/1 1000ser.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2005).
39. MUNICIPAL SECURITIES RULEMAKING BOARD, MSRB RULE
http://www.msrb.org/msrbl/rules/ruleg33.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2005).

at
BOOK,

at
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anything close to self-regulation as it was understood forty or fifty years
ago. It is totally different now.
MR. PELOSO: Where do the new electronic markets fit in this
picture, the Instinet's, etc.? Are they more like the regulated or the selfregulatory body?
MR. COLBY: Let me assure you they are not self-regulatory.
MR. PELOSO: Well, that is the one joke of the evening.
MR. COLBY: Electronic markets complicate the SRO question a
lot because they are running trading markets similar to the NASD, which
is a self-regulatory organization that began running a screen in 1971 and
then developed into the NASDAQ market.
But the 34 Act was written around trading markets. Congress said,
"We're going to have our trading markets register and be self-regulatory
organizations." 4
Now, the electronic markets are trading markets but they are not
self-regulatory organizations. That might be a model for the future, but
right now we have the model split, where some markets are SROs and
some are not. There are some advantages to being an exchange in this
world and there are some disadvantages, and I do not think the balance
has settled out yet.
We have applications from some of these electronic markets to
become exchanges. I do not think we have any de-applications from
exchanges.
MR. PELOSO: I would not dream of asking where you think that
issue is going to go, but I will ask you if you might comment on some of
the points on both sides of those issues as to whether they should be a
self-regulatory organization or not. Or you may not want to comment.
MR. COLBY: It gets very complex. First of all, when ATSs are
running a trading market they do not pretend to oversee their members.
In fact, this is a condition for ATSs not to be self-regulatory
organizations: that they do not use trading market power in order to
exercise constraints or requirements for their members. So they really
just run trading markets.
So the first question is: Is there something about running a trading
market that naturally compels it to be a self-regulatory organization?
MR. PELOSO: And if not, do they have an unfair competitive edge
over the exchanges?
40.

See supra note 10 at § 78(f).
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MR. BECKER: Well, it is framed that way, and we are of course
conflicted some six ways from Sunday on this. What some electronic
markets highlight is the unbundling of the trading mechanism. These
markets are looking for the cheapest way to run a server and process an
algorithmic match. These markets do not want to pay for member firm
services, they do not want to pay for oversight, and they do not want to
sell a brand name based on listing standards, or vetting issues, or
member oversight. These markets want to sell you the cheapest, fastest
execution. In effect, while such an approach sometimes is discussed as
unfair competition, it also dramatically demonstrates what happens
when you unbundle the trading engine from all of the processes that
goes along with operating a floor.
MR. COLBY: Can I add to that? The funding area gets very
complicated. This is close to Mary's heart. The markets that have
become self-regulatory organizations, the ECNs that have become
exchanges, still do not take on extensive member regulation. They
expect the NASD to cover that largely as a free good.
Some of the smaller exchanges historically have not done member
regulation. That said, the market has become more competitive. There
was a day when all the SROs said, "Well, it is good for the industry so
we are not going to try to work out who should be bearing these
different costs. We will just let the NYSE and the NASD do all the
customer-related supervision and they will find a way to collect for it
somehow. We will just do our floor and our own particular floor
members' supervision."
But now we are in a world where these markets are extremely
competitive with one another. For the industry's good the larger SROs
are still bearing these costs and funding them one way or another, but
this is not an equitable allocation of the costs of supervising SRO
members and trading floors.
MR. PELOSO: Marc, this is part of your constituency.
MR. LACKRITZ: First of all, I think there is no question about the
fact that the advent of technology and the ECMs4 ' has been a marvelous
development for the public and investors. It has been a terrific boon to

41.
Exempt commercial markets (ECMs) are electronic trading facilities providing
for the execution of principal-to-principal transactions. Commodity Futures Trading
Commission, at http://www.ctfc.gov/dealdeaxcombackground.htm (last visited Mar. 4,
2005).
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competition, it has created more innovation, it has reduced trading costs,
it has improved executions, and it spurred the SROs to new innovations.
It seems to me it is sort of an unalloyed good.
The problem you get into is when you get back into a selfregulatory morass, then you start trying to figure out, "Well, are they
more like an SRO, are they more like a broker-dealer, and how do they
get regulated?" And then they are sort of in another world, a nether
region.
Here are a few examples. The Archipelago Pacific Exchange
consists of one ECM that has actually migrated into being, in essence, an
exchange. Then there are all the other ones that are sort of outside,
floating around, where they are not fish and they are not fowl, but they
are adding some value because they are providing competition.
It seems to me they are definitely a force for good. They are
regulated now like broker-dealers basically, and I do not think that
makes a lot of sense. But on the other hand, I do not think you want to
constrain the innovation and you do not want to constrain the ability of
these entities to innovate, because that is where they really bring much
more value than whatever regulatory interstices they might happen to
fall into.
MR. BECKER: But you have a very difficult governance issue,
because if you go back to Annette's observation about her concerns
regarding the role of control persons, I think that is a way of saying,
"Well, how do you deal with governance issues?" If you are trying to
turn these things into SROs, are you really going to just come and say,
"Well, great, you have this great trading engine, and by the way, we
would like you to have a 50 percent public board of people who have no
idea what your business is'?"
MR. LACKRITZ: If I can just follow up on that, one of the things
that I think has changed about the governance issues in these SROs is
that we now have a majority of members of the boards of the SROs
coming from the public. This means that they are not associated with
the industry, God forbid, because we do not want to get too much
expertise into the board.
But at the same time, you look at how this has evolved and you
have to ask yourself: "Wait a minute. If the SEC, which is a public body
created by the Congress, overseen by the Congress, is an independent
regulatory agency which is responsible to the public, how much public
intervention do you need in this situation?"
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Now, everybody says, "Well, but the SROs may have missed a
couple of things here," or "the industry is lax because they are too
buddy-buddy with one another," or whatever that rationale is. At the
same time, if you then build in so much layering of public participation,
it seems to me you lose something in that process. You lose the
expertise; you lose the involvement and the engagement of the industry.
MR. PELOSO: It kind of seems to me that that may be part of what
has happened. If you go back to the Report's analysis of the pluses and
minuses of what the industry could contribute, it seems to me that there
is an emphasis on the limitations; that is, that the industry expertise has
been translated into industry self-interest and may be suspect, which
leads you to have a lack of expertise.4 2
That is nowhere more evident than in the dispute resolution process,
which I know is under Mary's jurisdiction. It started out, I think, some
years ago as being desirable to have people who were familiar with the
industry sit on these cases, the theory being that they would be able to
sort through these issues quickly, bringing their expertise to the table,
and so it would be a quick process.
I think the rules have changed since the Supreme Court allowed
arbitration of securities law issues.4 3 It seems to me the quid pro quo
was that new rules came into effect so that now you really have
arbitration panels probably being more like civil juries than industry
panels.
Is that because you have people who would normally be an outside
arbitrator, such as a lawyer such as myself, are now considered to be
industry people if you spent X amount of your time working for
securities firms, so you are presumed not to be fair? Isn't that an
instance of where you have the industry expertise, so to speak,
mistrusted, and therefore the "self' from self-regulation seems to be
withdrawn?
MS. SCHAPIRO: I would be happy to answer that, but I have to
respond to Marc first.
MR. LACKRITZ: I would have been disappointed if you hadn't.
MS. SCHAPIRO: I know you would.
"Public" does not mean people were dragged in off the street, when
42.
REPORT, supra note 14, part IV, at 695.
43.
Rodriguez de Quijas et al. v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477,
482 (1989).
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we talk about public directors, or in the case of the NASD, public
governors.
Our public directors include the Dean of Fordham's
Business School, the former Executive Director of CalPERS, the CEO
of Vanguard, the retired CEO of Metropolitan Life, the retired CEO of
Prudential Assurance from the U.K., and the CEO of Moody's. These
are not unsophisticated people who lack an understanding of financial
markets or securities markets. I say that just to put to bed any sort of
vision of the public being whoever happened to walk by the office that
day and looked like they had nothing else to do.
MR. LACKRITZ: I do not think I said that is the way they were
picked.
MS. SCHAPIRO: No, but I just want to make sure it was clear that
they bring an expertise to the board. I guess what I really want to say is
that they bring an expertise to the board that is very, very important.
And while it might not be in the intricacies of the operation of trading
desks, the industry does bring that and these people do bring a basic
understanding of financial markets at a minimum, and sometimes much,
much more than that.
I actually do not think the changes in the arbitration process have
really been driven by board members. I think it has been driven by, first
of all, the enormous influx of retail investors into our markets and the
requirement that they arbitrate as a result of signing pre-dispute
arbitration agreements, and the plaintiffs' bar. I think the plaintiffs' bar
is really largely responsible for many of the additional procedural
requirements that have been layered onto the process over the years.
MR. BECKER: Just to more broadly state it, a lot of people lost a
lot of money over the last several years, and in part they lost it because
of substantial and sustained abuses within the industry. That has called
into question its credibility, so that there have been structural reforms
that in some respects I think have gone too far but are necessary
elements and the logical consequences of a loss of trust in the ability of
self-policing that is going to take time to come back. I do not think that
is great rocket science, but I think it is part of this.
MR. LACKR!TZ: Could I just respond to that? I might add, just in
terms of material disclosure, that Brandon actually is our outside counsel
on a number of issues, so the fact that I am disagreeing with him, I want
to make sure that is clearly disclosed.
People lost a lot of money in the last couple of years because the
market took a downturn, the bubble burst, the economy was in recession,
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we had terrorist attacks, and there were corporate governance scandals.
I would suggest that the amount of industry misbehavior that caused
people to lose money is at least at number five or six on the list, it is not
anywhere close to the top.
Pendulums go back and forth as they always do. And maybe during
the 1990s it went too far in one direction, but it clearly has the potential
of going way too far back in the other direction if we are not very
careful and we do not proceed thoughtfully, carefully and specifically. I
think that is really important.
But I really think, just to follow up on my friend Mary's notion this
time with respect to Brandon, pinning all these losses on industry
misbehavior is completely ludicrous. We had a speculative bubble,
everybody bought into it. Now, is the industry partly responsible? Yes,
absolutely. Did we help to enable it? Yes, absolutely. Are we
responsible for this? I would say that is really an overreach, a grotesque
overreach.
MR. BECKER: I think it is obviously the Clinton Administration's
problem.
[Laughter.]
MR. PELOSO: Does anybody think that there should be a single
industry arbitration forum, as opposed to having the arbitration process
conducted separately by each SRO?
MS. SCHAPIRO: There practically is. I think more than 90 percent
of the cases are filed with NASD at this point. Last year we did about
9,000 cases in the NASD arbitration forum. We already do the
arbitration for the Philadelphia, for the Amex, for the MSRB. We're
moving that way.
We are not suggesting that there is not a value in multiple
arbitration forums, because there may well be, but practically MR. PELOSO: Do you think we are gravitating towards arbitration
being outsourced?
MS. SCHAPIRO: I think there are tremendous economies of scale
in running an operation like that. We have thousands of arbitrators on
the roster, and mediators, training them, and maintaining the technology
for list selection. All of those things really argue, I think, for a common
forum.
MR. PELOSO: I wish Rick were still here because he was saying
this evening that the arbitration function of the NYSE has just been put
under his mantle.
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MS. SCHAPIRO: Oh, good. That was a big question for a while.
MR. LACKRITZ: But, John, part of the problem in arbitration is
that we have a process that was originally designed to be a simple,
efficient, fair alternative to litigation. That made a lot of sense. If you
look at some of the research in terms of arbitration awards versus people
having to go to court, I think it demonstrates fairly clearly that
arbitration has worked extremely well. It is much faster, it is far more
efficient, and it is very fair. I mean investors win something like 52 or
53 percent of the cases that are brought in arbitration." Notwithstanding
the facts, it is still given a bad name in lots of different press and
reviews.
But what has happened to the process, partly because of the Due
Process Clause, partly because of the plaintiffs' bar, and partly just
because of the nature of lawyers, is it has gotten to the point where we
now have so much due process in arbitration that it is threatening to
become just like litigation. It is just as long, the discovery process is
just as complicated, difficult and contentious. I think we are risking
getting far away from the whole purpose that arbitration was designed
for in the first place.
I think the NASD has done a fabulous job in terms of setting up
arbitration panels and in developing expertise. It obviously has the best
brand name with respect to arbitration. That is why you are attracting
the entire market share.
MS. SCHAPIRO: I think it has more to do with the fact that we
have fifty-plus locations around the country where people can arbitrate.
We have really reached out to try to make it as easy for investors as we
can.
MR. LACKRITZ: I guess I am just concerned that it is going to
become much too litigation-like and it will lose the value that it had
when it was first proposed.
MS. NAZARETH: John, I am interested in your question, just
because I am not quite sure what the problem is. I agree with Mary that
there are probably some economies of scale and as long as there were a
sufficient number of arbitrators so that customers who were bringing
their cases to arbitration did not suffer greater delays it would work. As
44. Dagen McDowell, Frustrated Fund Investors Seek Arbitration, at
(last visited
http://www.thestreet.com/funds/mutualfundmondaydm/10029650.html
Mar. 4. 2005).
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a policy matter, if it was consolidated into one SRO, it would not offend
me. But, I guess I do not really understand why it is a problem if people
have a choice as to which arbitration venue to go to.
MR. PELOSO: I do not think personally there is a problem. It just
seemed to me that we were gravitating towards one forum, and I was
just wondering whether anybody has expressed the view that that is the
way it ought to end up because of economies of scale. I do not see any
problem. In my own experience, I have not experienced any problem.
I cannot let us disband without asking this question, which we have
touched on before: when the SROs are enforcing the federal securities
laws, as distinguished from their own rules-although those two ideas
sometimes come together, but not always--does the panel regard the
SRO as essentially acting in a quasi-governmental capacity or
functioning with a governmental function in the context of affording
constitutional rights? Does anybody have a view about that?
MR. BECKER: Yes.
MS. SCHAPIRO: No.
MR. PELOSO: Yes and no, okay.
Annette, do you have a view about that?
MS. NAZARETH: No.
MR. PELOSO: Brandon?
MR. BECKER: When you send every document request you
receive from an SRO to a U.S. Attorney, you do not think of the
document request from the SRO as being quasi-governmental.
MS. SCHAPIRO: I am not sure what that means.
MR. BECKER: It means that you are more worried about the
criminal liability when you are running parallel proceedings with an
SRO. Whether or not the SRO wants to tell you "we are just thinking
about your ethical standards," if the U.S. Attorney is thinking about a
new case on mail fraud or wire fraud, you are not thinking about ethical
standards. Irrespective of the good faith of the SRO and its individuals
and the fact that they are trying to fulfill their responsibilities, when you
put that overlay of criminal inquiry on top of parallel SRO inquiries, it is
like trying to deal with a request from the Division of Enforcement with
a parallel Office of Inspections and Examinations ("OCIE"), which
comes in and looks at broker-dealers. If OCIE comes in and asks for a
bunch of documents at the same time that there is a parallel inquiry by
the Division of Enforcement, that is not just a question about technical
compliance and oversight procedures.
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MS. SCHAPIRO: I obviously understand that. I think the problem
is that the SROs cannot step away every time there is criminal interest in
something, or "We will have complete criminalization of the securities
laws," which was the hue and cry a few years ago. We have to
obviously fulfill our obligations to enforce the securities laws and
NASD rules.
I will say I think it is pretty rare that we bring a case that does not
allege violation of NASD rules or our ethical standards and just alleges a
violation of the SEC rules. We work very hard not to be a state actor
under the law; and not to operate at the direction of the SEC in any way.
MR. PELOSO: Of course there is one exception. That is when the
NASD is sued for some reason in federal court, they assert that they
have the same immunity protections as the federal government, and you
have been successful at that.
MS. SCHAPIRO: We have been successful defending our
immunity.
MR. LACKRITZ: But my understanding is there was a case back in
1999 in the Second Circuit-I should confess I am a recovering lawyer.
I was trained as a lawyer. I have never practiced securities law, which
should be obvious-but I understand there was a case in the Second
Circuit that basically said that in fact the NASD and the SROs actually
function as contractual enforcement agencies, and specifically said they
are not an agency of the federal government, they do not have the same
power, they do not have the same authority, and as a result do not have
the same rights.4 5
MS. SCHAPIRO: That is right. That is why the constitutional
rights do not apply. Our enforcement is by virtue of a contract that
when you sign the U-4 to become a member of the NASD through your
brokerage firm, you have contractually obligated yourselves to fulfill
NASD rules and requirements and also to provide us with testimony and
documents whenever we request them. That is why there is no Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. You can refuse to give
us the documents, but then we can act upon your membership.
MR. BECKER: That body of law was developed when we still had
more of a club-like approach to the SROs.46 That was effectively
eliminated with the amendment to § 15(b)(8) of the 34 Act, which
45.
46.

Desiderio v. NASD, 191 F.3d 198, 207 (1999).
See supra note 31.
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compelled every broker-dealer to become a member of an SRO. 47 So
the only contract is the one that is in the statute that directs you to be a
member of an SRO, and you get to pick whether it is the NYSE or the
NASD, but you are still stuck with being in an SRO.
But the body of case law Mary refers to is well developed and there
has not been a lot of willingness of the courts to reexamine it because, in
part, I think they are concerned that to reexamine it would open up the
proverbial floodgates.
MR. PELOSO: It remains an interesting issue, and I suspect that
sometime in the future the right case might bring a change in the law.
But who knows?
We are at the end of where we said we were going to stop, but
would everybody here entertain a question or two before we go have a
glass of wine?
Does anybody have something they want to raise with the panel? I
guess I will use the prerogative of cutting it off if it goes too long.
QUESTION: Actually, it might be a question for Mr. Colby. There
is consolidation in the ECM space, and we could see a very large ECM
that would hit the 40 percent threshold under Regulation ATS.4 8 At that
stage, would you require that ECM to become an exchange?
MR. COLBY: Yes. Regulation ATS gives the Commission
discretion to require a dominant market to register as an exchange, and I
would not wish to predict what the Commission would do in that
situation.
QUESTION: Ms. Nazareth, could you talk a little bit about how the
debate over NYSE self-regulation would be affected if the SEC were to
sanction the NYSE over the specialist case? And could you also talk a
little bit about whether the flaws have been magnified in the last year in
terms of NYSE self-regulation, and are there real questions about
whether that ought to continue?
MS. NAZARETH: I think the of recent self-governance changes at
the NYSE hold out a promise for a better structure. The problems that
you alluded to with the specialists obviously preceded all of these
changes. I hope that the NYSE governance changes and other related
Commission initiatives dealing with enhanced SRO governance,
transparency and oversight-if adopted-would continue to improve
47.
48.

See supra note 10 at § 78(o).
17 C.F.R. § 242.301 (2005).
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how the SROs operate, In light of this, I would not expect in the short
term for the staff to be recommending further significant governance
changes at the NYSE.
QUESTION: There was a proposal last year in front of Congress to
limit the ability of the state regulators, their enforcement ability. 49 It
passed, I believe, the House and had a fair amount of support in
Congress to limit their authority over the securities laws. I am curious
what the panelists' thoughts are on whether the states should stay
involved or not.
MR. PELOSO: It sounds like it is right up your alley.
MR. LACKRITZ: You are right. There was a proposal that
Congressman Baker put forward as part of SEC enforcement legislation
that was going to try to preclude individual states from using
enforcement actions to regulate the industry within their states. It would
try to preempt states from regulating the industry, as opposed to
enforcing anti-fraud statutes or enforcing their law.
There were a lot of mischaracterizations that flew around about
what this language actually did. It was not designed in any way, shape,
or form to limit their enforcement power or their enforcement ability,
and yet that is the way it was pitched by Attorney General Spitzer and
some of the opponents of the legislation. It became sufficiently
controversial that Congressman Baker dropped it out of his SEC
enforcement legislation. The bill went forward and the Committee
reported it without the provision about curbing the states' ability to
regulate nationally.
From the standpoint of the industry, it is a bit ludicrous to thinkyou know, you think about Gulliver's Travels and Gulliver being tied
down by a bunch of Lilliputians-that if you are competing globally, the
notion of fifty different states being able to regulate your business
obviously is not a particularly effective or efficient way to regulate.
So from our perspective it makes a great deal of sense to have the
SEC as our primary preeminent national regulator setting uniform
national standards. At the same time, the states have an important role
as enforcers of the regulations and laws.
So the question is: how can you craft something in a way that does
not impinge on the states' enforcement ability but also does not allow
them to create regulations in the course of either settling an enforcement
49.

Sec. Fraud Deterrence and Restitution Act of 2003, H.R. 2179 (2003).
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dispute or regulating on their own? That is what we were trying to do.
Congressman Baker, I think, was trying to do something similar.
MR. BECKER: That touches on an issue that haunts this other
debate, which is rule-making by enforcement. You would not quite
have, I think, the same pressures on this preemption side if states were
using enforcement actions to address someone who runs away with the
money or someone who recommends unsuitable securities. But when,
instead, what you are doing is in the name of settling a case, creating
what are in effect industry-wide rules, I think it puts more pressure on
the preemption analysis.
MR. PELOSO: On behalf of the School and the Center, I would
like to thank our distinguished panel for traveling up here to be with us
and expressing the views that you have. Thank you very much.

